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shutterstock_146470052This article follows up on a recent article reported in Reuters concerning Atlas Energy LP’s private placement partnerships in oil and gas. Atlas Resources LLC, a subsidiary the energy group, has filed documents with the SEC for Atlas Resources Series 34-2014 LP stating that it seeks to raise as much as $300 million by Dec. 31 of 2014. The deal allows investors to participate in investments where advances in drilling technology have turned previously inaccessible reservoirs of oil into viable prospects. In addition, Atlas promises to invest up to $145 million of its own capital alongside investors.

In the last article we explored how the house seems more likely to win on these deals over investors. But beyond the inherent risks with speculating on oil and gas and unknown oil deposits most investors don’t realize the deals are often unfair to investors. In a normal speculative investment as the investment risk goes up the investor demands greater rewards to compensate for the additional risk. However, with oil and gas private placements the risks are sky high and the rewards simply don’t match up.

In order to counter this criticism, issuers say that the tax benefits of their deals where the investor can write off more than 90 percent of their initial outlay the year they make it helps defray the risk and increase the value proposition. First, the same tax advantage claims are often nominal compared to the principal risk of loss of the investment as seen by Puerto Rican investors in the UBS Bond Funds who have now seen their investments decline by 50% or more in some cases. Second, often times brokers sell oil and gas investments indiscriminately to the young and old who have lower incomes and cannot take advantage of the tax benefits.

shutterstock_103610648As recently reported in Reuters, Atlas Energy LP has marketed itself to investors as a way to get into the U.S. energy boom. By contributing at least $25,000 in a private placement partnership that will drill for oil and gas in states such as Texas, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania and share in revenues generated from the wells. Atlas Resources LLC, a subsidiary the energy group, has filed documents with the SEC for Atlas Resources Series 34-2014 LP stating that it seeks to raise as much as $300 million by Dec. 31 of 2014. The deal sounds good when pitched: participate in investments where advances in drilling technology have turned previously inaccessible reservoirs of fossil fuels into potentially viable prospects and to boot Atlas will invest up to $145 million of its own capital alongside investors. Through this method and similar deals, oil and gas projects have issued nearly 4,000 private placements since 2008 seeking to raise as much as $122 billion.

But before you take the plunge a review of the Atlas’s offering memorandum reveals some red flags and given Atlas’ past failure rate investors should think twice. First, up to $45 million of the money raised will be paid to Atlas affiliate Anthem Securities that will then be turned over to as commissions to broker-dealers who pitch the deal to investors. Up to $39 million more will be used to buy drilling leases from another affiliate. Think investors will get a fair price on the leases when Atlas controls both sides of the deal? More conflicts ahead as Atlas affiliated suppliers may also get up to $53 million for buying drilling and transport equipment. Next, an additional $8 million of Atlas’s investment is a 15 percent markup on estimated equipment costs. Finally, Atlas will pay itself nearly $52 million in various other fees and markups.

In sum, at least 40% of Atlas’s $145 million investment alongside mom and pop goes right back to the company. In addition, Atlas’ profits don’t stop there, when the venture starts generating revenue Atlas is entitled to 33% before accounting for those payments and markups. In the end, not much of a risk at all for Atlas.

Tshutterstock_95643673he Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) recently filed a complaint against LPL Financial LLC (LPL) broker Jon Cox (Cox) alleging that Cox may have engaged in unauthorized outside business activities, private securities transactions (a/k/a “selling away”), and/or unauthorized customer loans. According to Cox’s BrokerCheck, Cox was terminated in January 2014 by LPL on allegations of violations of the firm policy regarding outside business activities. Cox’s disclosures also reveal that he works for a DBA Investment and Retirement Services Group in Knoxville, TN. In addition he is a sales agent for Proton Power, Inc.

While details concerning Cox’s activities are still pending, the allegations against Cox are consistent with a “selling away” securities violation. Selling away occurs when a financial advisor solicits investments in companies or promissory notes that were not approved by the broker’s affiliated firm. Under the FINRA rules, a brokerage firm owes a duty to properly monitor and supervise its employees. In order to properly supervise their brokers each firm is required to establish and maintain a system to supervise the activities of each registered representative to achieve compliance with the securities laws. Selling away often occurs in environments where the brokerage firms either fails to put in place a reasonable supervisory system or fails to actually implement that system and meet supervisory requirements.

In selling away cases, investors are unaware that the advisor’s investment advice is not authorized and potentially illegal because the securities sold are often not registered with the SEC. Typically investors will not learn that the broker’s activities were wrongful until after the investment scheme is publicized or the broker simply shuts down shop and stops returning client calls.

shutterstock_186772637The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) recently barred former Aegis Capital Corp. (Aegis) broker Malcom Segal (Segal) alleging that Segal may have engaged in unauthorized transfers of funds from customer accounts to an outside business activities (a/k/a “selling away”).

According to Segal’s BrokerCheck, Segal was registered with Cumberland Brokerage Corporation from 1989 until April 2011. Thereafter, Segal was a broker for Aegis until July 2014 where he was terminated on allegations of by the firm violations of the firm that Segal failed to cooperate with an internal investigation into a customer complaint he made unauthorized wire transfers from a customer’s account. Segal’s disclosures also reveal that he is listed as a partner of J & M Financial and President of National C.D. Sales.

Upon information and belief, it is in connection with National C.D. Sales that customer have filed complaints against Segal concerning. While details concerning Segal’s activities are still pending, the allegations against Cox are consistent with a “selling away” securities violation. Selling away occurs when a financial advisor solicits investments in companies or promissory notes that were not approved by the broker’s affiliated firm. In many cases the broker transfers funds or liquidates investments at his registered firm in order to make the investment in the outside business.

shutterstock_183011084The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm Global Brokerage Services, Inc. (Global) over allegations that from approximately February 2011, to August 2013, Global failed to establish and enforce a reasonable supervisory system regarding the use of consolidated reports by registered brokers with the firm. FINRA found that Global’s brokers provided consolidated reports to their customers that lacked required disclosures and/or contained misleading information. ln addition, FINRA alleged that one the brokers disseminated consolidated reports that included his own inaccurate and potentially misleading valuations for non-traded REITs and other illiquid investments.

Global has been a FINRA member since 1995, employs fourteen registered representatives, and its main office is in Hunt Valley, Maryland.

FINRA found that certain of Global’s brokers created consolidated reports using Morningstar or Excel for distribution to their customers. FINRA alleged that Global failed to have written supervisory procedures specific to consolidated reports. Instead, FINRA determined that consolidated reports at Global were treated as correspondence requiring only a sample (10%) be reviewed on a quarterly basis.

shutterstock_176284139The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm Cantella & Co., Inc. (Cantella) over allegations that from approximately January 2006, to September 2011, the firm charged customers excessive commissions on approximately 1,270 equity transactions and 99 options transactions. FINRA also found that Cantella also failed to establish, maintain, and enforce an adequate supervisory system for the review of commissions charged.

Cantella has been a member of FINRA since 1983, the firm’s principal office is located in Boston, MA, and currently employs approximately 210 registered representatives working out of the principal office and 136 branch offices.

NASD Conduct Rule 2440 provides that all brokerage firms shall buy or sell at a security at a price which is fair, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances. The NASD established a policy that a mark-up of five percent may be deemed unreasonable and this policy applies equally to commissions on agency trades, and to mark-ups or mark-downs on principal transactions. In addition to the commission percentage other factors to be considered in determining the fairness of commission charges include: (i) the type of security involved; (ii) the availability of the security; (iii) the price of the security; (iv) the size of the transaction; (v) whether disclosure of the transaction cost was made to the customer prior to the trade’s execution; (vi) pattern of mark-ups; and (vii) the nature of the member’s business.

shutterstock_178801067This article continues the examination of the findings by The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), concerning LaSalle St. Securities, LLC (LaSalle) private placement deficiencies.  FINRA also found that LaSalle served as the placement agent for a 2009 private placement offering by Revitalight Operators, LLC. The private placement memorandum (PPM) stated investors would be entitled to a 9% “preferred return” on their outstanding investments prior but that this preferred return was not guaranteed and might never be paid. FINRA found that LaSalle was responsible for the PPM’s contents. The PPM contained a summary of financial projections which FINRA found contained assumptions that the total net return over six years would be $2.050 million and that investors’ capital contributions would be returned in the fiftieth month. The PPM stated that investors could receive a 27.13% annual return on investment. However, FINRA determined that the projected annual return were calculated using a flawed methodology.

Finally, FINRA alleged that member firms that using consolidated reports are communications with the public and must be clear, accurate, and not misleading. Firms should have systems in place to ensure that valuations provided regarding customer assets held at the firm are consistent with the firm’s official account statement distributed to the customer. The firm should also take reasonable steps to accurately reflect information regarding outside accounts and assets. If a firm is unable to adequately supervise the use of the reports then the firm must prohibit dissemination of the reports.

FINRA found that LaSalle had procedures in place governing consolidated reports. The procedures provided that the CCO or specifically designated principals, will review the consolidated reports to ensure adherence to all applicable rules. Despite the procedures, FINRA found that LaSalle had an inadequate system in place because the firm did not ensure that all representatives actually followed the proscribed procedures. FINRA determined that LaSalle’s training was limited to blast emails to brokers advising them that consolidated statements needed to be submitted to the home office for review as correspondence.

shutterstock_187532306The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), in an acceptance, waiver, and consent action (AWC), sanctioned brokerage firm LaSalle St. Securities, LLC (LaSalle) over allegations that staff found certain deficiencies with respect to: 1) a private placement offering involving Seat Exchange Corporation where LaSalle failed to exercise adequate due diligence before allowing a broker to recommend the offering to four investors; 2) a private offering by Revitalight Operators, LLC, LaSalle distributed a private placement memorandum to potential investors that did not include material facts and used a flawed methodology for projecting return on investment; 3) an offering of Platinum Wealth Partners, Inc. (PWP) by one of its brokers the firm failed to supervise; and 4) the fact that LaSalle allowed its representatives to send consolidated reports to its customers but failed to adequately supervise those reports.

LaSalle has been registered with FINRA as a broker-dealer since 1976, has 232 registered representatives, 107 branch offices, and its principal place of business is in Chicago, Illinois. LaSalle has various business lines.

FINRA alleged that in April 2010, a broker with the initials “PL” sought the firm’s approval to recommend the purchase of shares in Seat Exchange Corporation, a Regulation D private placement to four customers. Seat Exchange had only one director, who also owned 21.5% of the company and the placement agent for offering was Chicago Investment Group (CIG). CIG was also an affiliated with Seat Exchange. According to FINRA, LaSalle had supervisory procedures requiring that all appropriate due diligence efforts on behalf of any private placement offering are undertaken and documented or that we obtain sufficient documentation from a third party that they have undertaken sufficient due diligence.

shutterstock_50736130Your brokerage firm reviews customer accounts for misconduct and what does it find; bizarre and unreasonable trading activity. Maybe dozens of trades are being made every month or an account previously invested in plain vanilla mutual funds is now loaded up with speculative penny stocks and private placements. Whatever the cause, the firm has a system to monitor for unusual trading activity and sends the customer a letter. These letters go by many names including “happiness”, “comfort”, and more appropriately “Cover You’re A@!” (CYA).

A recent article by the Wall Street Journal explored how the purpose of these letters is to elicit an acknowledgment from the customer that they are satisfied with how the account is being handled in order to minimize future liability from a suit concerning the wrongful activity. To clarify, when a brokerage firm finds indications of possible misconduct their first action isn’t to stop the misconduct and help their client but to get the client to release the firm from liability.

Having reviewed dozens of these letters myself they are designed to be unreadable to the average investor and use industry jargon and legal lingo that is indecipherable to anyone but a securities attorney. These letters begin warmly enough by thanking you for your business and hoping that everything is well with you. Then the conversation becomes impersonal and maybe mentions that your investment choices have become more risky or aggressive recently. These sentences are code words for your investment objectives have completely changed from generating retirement income to you are now interested in potentially losing all your money with casino level risk. Maybe some information related to a “cost-to-equity ratio” or “turnover” is given. There is no explanation as to what these terms mean or why you should be concerned because they are just being provided for legal reasons that the customer should be unconcerned with.

shutterstock_175000886The law offices of Gana Weinstein LLP are investigating a series of claims before The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in relation to the conduct of financial advisor Robert Smith (Smith). Smith has been accused by at least 10 customers over his career concerning allegations that Smith overconcentrated the customer’s accounts in private placement securities including equipment leasing programs, oil & gas investments, and non-traded real estate investment trusts (Non-traded REITs).

Smith has been registered with several broker dealers over the years. Starting in 2000 Smith was registered with American General Securities (n/k/a SagePoint Financial, Inc.) until May 2006. Thereafter, Smith was associated with ProEquities, Inc. until June 2010. Finally, from June 2010, until June 2014, Smith was registered with Berthel, Fisher & Company Financial Services, Inc. (Berthel Fisher). Currently, Smith is not registered with any FINRA firm. Upon information and belief, from 2006 on Smith operated his securities business under a DBA called Proactive Retirement Investing.

The large number of complaints against Smith concerning the same or similar charges of misconduct is unusual in the brokerage industry. Most brokers go their entire careers without a single complaint. A small number have one or two complaints. But only a tiny percentage have more than two customer complaints. Here, at least 10 customers have made allegations against Smith all concerning difficult to value private placement securities.

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