Securities Lawyers Blog

FINRA Bars Broker Richard Manchester of Girard Securities Over Private Placement Sales

November 7, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has barred broker Richard Manchester (Manchester) over allegations that his participation in several private placements caused his employing firm to fail to establish an escrow account for several contingency offerings, broke escrow before the minimum contingency amounts were met, and made unauthorized use of offering proceeds by lending offering proceeds to other private placements. FINRA found that Manchester’s acts violated of Section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-9 thereunder, NASD Rule 2110, and FINRA Rules 2020 and 2010.

From July 2004 through December 2010, Manchester was associated with Girard Securities, Inc. (Girard Securities). During this time Manchester was involved in the offering of several private placement offerings. One offering was Pacific Yogurt Partners, LLC (Pacific Yogurt) a limited liability corporation formed in 2007 to acquire franchise rights from Golden Spoon Frozen Yogurt. The Pacific Yogurt private placement offered Series B and Series C Units in a contingency offering requiring the raising of a minimum amount of funds for the offering to proceed. FINRA alleged that even though the private placement memorandum stated that funds received would be returned to investors if the minimum sales contingency was not met the funds were released to the issuer. In addition, under the securities laws investor funds received before the satisfaction of the minimum sales contingencies were required to be deposited into a bank escrow account. Instead, FINRA found that the funds provided directly to Pacific Yogurt, the issuer. FINRA alleged that Manchester’s conduct constituted a willful violation of Rule 10b-9, and a violation of NASD Rule 2110 and FINRA Rule 2010.

Another private placement Manchester was involved in offering was WaveWise, LLC (WaveWise). WaveWise was created to acquire interest in IdeaEdge, Inc. (IdeaEdge). The offering sought to purchase up to 2,625,000 shares of IdeaEdge common stock, at $0.80 per share, with warrants to purchase a share of common stock at $1.00 per share for every four shares of common stock purchased at $.80 per share. Thereafter, IdeaEdge changed its name to Social Wise, Inc. (Social Wise), which subsequently changed to Bill My Parents. Like Pacific Yogurt, FINRA alleged that investor funds received before the satisfaction of the minimum sales contingency were required to be deposited into a bank escrow but instead were deposited into a bank account in the name of WaveWise.

What are Leveraged or Non-Traditional ETFs?

November 6, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

A leveraged Exchange Traded Fund (non-traditional or leveraged ETFs) is a security that employs debt, or leverage, in order to amplify the returns of an underlying stock position. Leveraged ETFs are generally available for most security indexes such as the S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100. A leveraged ETF with 300% leverage will return 3% if the underlying index returns 1%. Nontraditional ETFs can also be designed to return the inverse of the benchmark.

Leveraged ETFs are generally used only for short term trading. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has warned that most leveraged ETFs reset daily, meaning that they are designed to achieve their stated objectives on a daily basis. As a result, the performance of nontraditional ETFs held over the long term can differ significantly from the performance of their underlying index or benchmark during the same period. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has acknowledged that leveraged ETF carry significant risks and are inherent complexity of the products. Accordingly, FINRA advises brokers that nontraditional ETFs are typically not suitable for retail investors.

Recently, FINRA sanctioned and suspended broker Michael E. French (French) over allegations that the broker recommended unsuitable transactions in leveraged and inverse ETFs in the accounts of elderly customers. FINRA also alleged that French held the leveraged ETFs in his customers’ accounts for extended periods contrary to Wells Fargo Advisor’s (Wells Fargo) written supervisory procedures.

Managed Futures Funds Erase Investor Gains with Excessive Fees

November 5, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

From January 2003 through the end of 2012, Morgan Stanley enticed over 30,000 customers to invest $797 million collectively into a managed-futures fund called Morgan Stanley Smith Barney Spectrum Technical L.P. The prospectus for Spectrum Technical fund characterized the fund as potentially profitable “when traditional markets are experiencing losses” and recommended the fund as a way to diversify beyond traditional stocks and bonds. The prospectus boasted that over a twenty-three year period, people who invested ten percent of their assets in managed futures outperformed portfolios comprised only of stocks and bonds.

The Spectrum Technical fund earned $490.3 million in trading gains and money-market interest income from 2003 through 2012. However, investors who remained in the fund during this period did not receive any of the returns because the commissions, expenses, and fees paid to fund managers and Morgan Stanley totaled $498.7 million. Thus, Spectrum Technical investors lost $8.3 million simply because the fees charged to the fund were greater than the gains.

Morgan Stanley advertised to clients that its managed futures funds performed well when the stock market was hit hard in 2000 and late 2007 and even gained 22.5 percent after fees in 2008. The firm further stated that it only sells these funds to qualified investors, and that it clearly defines the risks and fees for customers. Although these disclosures may provide insight as to the effect of fees on investor gains, information regarding fund managers’ conflicts of interest is often buried deep in the fund’s prospectus or regulatory filings.

FINRA Bars Broker Mark Hotton Alleging Numerous Fraudulent Activities in Client Accounts

November 4, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has permanently barred broker Mark Christopher Hotton (Hotton) alleging that the broker engaged in numerous and repeated frauds including forgery, falsification of documents, conversion, misuse of funds, manipulating account records, churning, unauthorized trading, false testimony, and providing false information and documents to FINRA.

FINRA alleged that starting from at least 2006, Hotton engaged in numerous fraudulent investment schemes to steal at least $5,932,000 from his brokerage customers. FINRA admitted that due to the complexity of the fraud that it had not been able to track down Hotton’s entire use and receipt of ill-gotten funds. According to FINRA, Hotton converted funds from his customers by using his control over the bank accounts of various corporate entities to divert funds that his customers believed were being invested in legitimate businesses.

Fom November 2002 until November 2005, Hotton was associated with Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., Inc., From November 2005 until February 2009, Hotton was associated with Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. (Oppenheimer). While at Oppenheimer, Hotton focused on clients with an average net worth of between $1,000,000 and $20,000,000. Thereafter, Hotton was a registered representative of American Capital Partners, LLC until August 2010. From September 2010 until March 2012, Hotton was associated with Alexander Capital, L.P. Finally, from February 2012 until May 2012, Hutton was associated with Obsidian Financial Group, LLC. Obsidian terminated Hotton’s registration on May 31, 2012.

FINRA Files Regulatory Action Against Beverly Hills Broker Bambi Holzer

October 31, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) filed a civil enforcement action on October 18, 2013 against Bambi Holzer, a formerly registered broker and investment advisor in Beverly Hills, California. FINRA alleged in its complaint that between February and March 2008, Holzer, then a broker at Wedbush Securities, Inc. in Los Angeles, made unsuitable recommendations to seven of her clients to purchase speculative and illiquid investments issued by Provident Shale Royalties 8, LLC. The complaint further alleged that after investing in Provident 8, Holzer’s clients’ accounts were overly concentrated in the highly risky private placement. FINRA highlighted that one of the seven victims of Holzer’s alleged misconduct was an 86 year-old widow who is now deceased. This particular investor’s objectives were income and preservation of principal, meaning the risky and illiquid Provident 8 was blatantly outside the scope of her investment objectives.

In connection with these unsuitable recommendations, Holzer is accused of either knowingly or negligently submitting false net worth information regarding six of the seven customers. Additionally, FINRA alleged that between April 2010 and August 2012, Holzer willfully failed to disclose an arbitration award and judgment and a pending regulatory action on her Form U4, a required regulatory filing. Holzer is also accused of providing false testimony during on-the-record interviews conducted by FINRA.

Early in 2008, Wedbush Securities entered into an agreement with Provident 8 that allowed the investment firm to sell Provident 8’s privately issued securities. Holzer subsequently began recommending Provident 8 to her customers and received a 100 percent commission for those clients that invested. Based on allegations that Provident had commingled assets and investor funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission obtained a Temporary Restraining Order against Provident Royalties, LLC in July 2009. Provident ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and Holzer’s customers’ investments in Provident 8 became worthless.

What are Tenants-in-Common Securities?

October 30, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

Tenants-in-common real estate investments (“TIC”) are a more than $1-billion a year industry. However, with all innovative investment products, TIC investments receive their share of complaints from unhappy investors who bought them through a private placement. In FINRA arbitration, these complaints materialize as suitability claims and allegations of negligent misrepresentation. Usually, one or more of the following claims are made:

Investing in a TIC was not appropriate for me because of my needs, experience, or risk tolerance.
My broker did not perform adequate due diligence on the,offering materials of the TIC, appraisals of the underlying properties, persons promoting the TIC.

Do I Have a Securities or Investment Claim?

October 29, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

This is the most common question a potential client asks during an initial interview. This article is directed to those investors who are wondering if they have a claim but have not yet sought a consultation. Hopefully, this article will provide some insight into what a securities fraud attorney looks at when reviewing a potential client’s claim. However, I would stress that all evaluations are individual in nature and while this article is meant to provide generally instructive insight, only a full one-on-one consultation with an attorney can provide a full review of your claim and provide individual guidance.

In my analysis of a potential client’s securities claim I look at two primary factors: 1) the strength of the liability case; and 2) the ability to collect from the defendant. The answer to these two factors weigh heavily in moving forward with the potential client’s claim. The strength of the liability of the claim is the initial assessment of how likely a judge or arbitration panel would likely find the defendant liable for misconduct. The ability to collect factor looks at what potential defendants could be liable for the misconduct the client is alleging and the ability of those defendants to compensate the client’s losses. In many cases, the second factor will not need to be seriously investigated.

What factors influence the strength of the liability of the case? This is a hard question to answer because each case is different and liability is premised on different factors given the type of claims being made. In cases of fraud or misrepresentation the strength of the case often lies in the ability to prove the false statements made to the client. Written communications, emails, advertisements, and other documents that can be proven false or misleading tend to make stronger cases. If a securities regulator has also found the defendant’s conduct to be fraudulent or misleading or has disciplined the same or another brokerage firm for similar conduct such evidence helps to strengthen the case.

Broker Sanctioned Over Unsuitable Sales of Private Placement Securities

October 28, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

All brokers and broker-dealers have an obligation to ensure that their investment or investment strategy recommendation is suitable for the customer. All sales efforts must be reasonable and appropriate for the investor based upon the investor’s risk tolerance, investment objectives, age, financial circumstances, other investment holdings, experience, and other facts or information disclosed by the investor.

With respect to the sale of private placements, regulators have found significant problems in the due diligence and sales efforts of some brokerage firms when selling private placements to investors. These problems include fraud, misrepresentations and omissions in sales materials and offering documents, conflicts of interest, and suitability abuses.

In order for a brokerage firm to meet its due diligence obligation, the brokerage firm must make reasonable efforts to gather and analyze information both about the private placement and the customer the security is being sold to. Private Placements are considered “alternative investments” and are inherently speculative. Consequently, a broker must also ensure that an investment recommendation in a private placement is suitable for the particular customer. The broker must ensure that the client can withstand the risk taken and not imperil the client’s account by concentrating their assets in speculative investments.

Fidelity In Lawsuit Over Its Employees’ 401(k) Plan

October 24, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

On March 19, 2013, a former employee of Fidelity Investments filed suit in the U.S. District Court in Boston, Massachusetts against her former employer alleging self-dealing with respect to the management of the FMR LLC Profit Sharing Plan, Fidelity’s 401(k) plan. In September, twenty-six additional current and former Fidelity employees joined a proposed class action lawsuit against Fidelity. The complaint captioned, Bilewicz v. Fidelity Investments, alleges that the FMR LLC Profit Sharing Plain offered expensive Fidelity mutual funds despite the availability of lower-fee mutual funds within Fidelity’s own investment offerings and the offerings of outside providers.

Fidelity’s 401(k) plan holds approximately $8.5 billion in assets for more than 50,000 of its employees. Fidelity generally makes annual profit sharing contributions to the plan in addition to matching up to 7% of its employees’ salary contributions.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) creates a fiduciary duty for 401(k) plans, meaning Fidelity, and any other 401(k) plan provider, must act in the best interest of its employee investors. The complaint in this case alleges that Fidelity and some of its officers failed to uphold thier fiduciary duty with respect to selecting, evaluating, monitoring, and removing investment options from the Fidelity 401(k) Plan. The complaint alleges that Fidelity and certain officers selected high-fee Fidelity mutual fund products that financially benefited Fidelity instead of acting in the best interest of their employees.

Advanced Equities and First Allied Sales of Fisker Automotive Private Placements Under Scrutiny – Part II

October 23, 2013 | by Staff Attorney

This article continues my in depth look into how unsuspecting investors are sold speculative private placements.

While investors were told that Fisker Auto’s prospects were fantastic, nothing could have been further from the truth. In February 2012, the DOE loan had been frozen after $192 million had been given to the company because it hadn’t hit certain milestones with its Karma car product. The last payment Fisker had received from the DOE was in May 2011. Yet, according to investors, Advanced Equities and First Allied continued to sell Fisker Auto shares without disclosing that the DOE was no longer backing the venture, presumptively because the auto makers chances of success had grown increasingly slim.

From December 2011 into 2012, Advanced Equities increasing began to run into fundraising problems. As Fisker Auto fell into a increasing number of technical, delivery, and political problems with its cars the car maker’s ability to attract new capital plummeted. Yet, the company still needed money. So the brokerage firms turned to threatening investors by telling them that unless they agreed to invest more money into Fisker Auto their current shares will be diluted and their preferred stock will be converted to common stock.