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BNP Paribas Securities Corp. is the U.S. broker-dealer of BNP Paribas, providing market making, brokerage, investment banking, prime brokerage, and futures commission merchant services mainly to institutions, other broker-dealers, and affiliates. Registered with the SEC since 1984 and based in New York, the firm is a primary dealer that participates in U.S. Treasury auctions and is wholly owned by BNP Paribas USA Inc.
BNP Paribas Securities Corp. – By the Numbers:
- CRD #: 15794
- Regulatory Events: 100
- Arbitration Events: 1
- Broker Employees: 1,462
BNP Paribas Securities Corp. – In the News:
FINRA v. BNP Paribas Securities Corp. (Case #2021069219701) – From October 2019 to April 2024, BNPS failed to report 842 over-the-counter (OTC) options positions to the Large Options Positions Reporting (LOPR) system in 167,520 instances in violation of FINRA Rules 2360(b)(5) and 2010. In addition, from October 2019 to April 2025, BNPS failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system, including written supervisory procedures (WSPs), reasonably designed to achieve compliance with FINRA Rule 2360 in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010. For these violations, the firm agrees to a censure and a fine of $125,000.
FINRA v. BNP Paribas Securities Corp. (Case #2019063673101) – From July 2017 through May 2019, the firm over-reported 127,561 transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities to TRACE in violation of FINRA Rules 6730(a)(5) and 2010. From February 2018 through November 2020, the firm incorrectly appended the “.S” modifier to the TRACE reports for 782,320 Treasury transactions in violation of FINRA Rules 6730(d)(4)(G) and 2010. From July 2017 through November 2020, the firm failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with FINRA Rule 6730 in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010.
FINRA v. BNP Paribas Securities Corp. (Case #2016049876001) – During the periods from April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016, and from January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018 (the “Late Trade Review Period”), BNP failed to timely report over 10,000 transactions in TRACE-Eligible Corporate Debt Securities to TRACE, in violation of FINRA Rules 6730(a) and 2010. During the period between April 1, 2016 and September 30, 2016, BNP reported 135 transactions in TRACE-Eligible Corporate Debt securities with an inaccurate contra-party identifier to TRACE, in violation of FINRA Rules 6730(c)(6) and 2010. During the period from April 1, 2016 through January 31, 2019 (the “Supervisory Review Period”), BNP’s supervisory system was not reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the firm’s transaction reporting obligations for TRACE-Eligible Securities, in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010.
FINRA v. BNP Paribas Securities Corp. (Case #2015044231302) – This matter resulted from routine examinations of the firm’s Global Execution Services desk (“GES Desk”) by the staff of the Trading and Financial Compliance Examination (“TFCE”) staff (the “staff”) of the Department of Market Regulation (“Market Regulation”). In the period September 22-23, 2015 (the “2015 exam period”), the firm submitted inaccurate, incomplete, or improperly formatted information to OATS, in violation of FINRA Rules 7450 and 2010. In the period January 1, 2015 through September 30, 2015, the firm failed to make publicly available all information required in order to comply with Rule 606 of Regulation NMS and FINRA Rule 2010. During the period January 1, 2015 through August 18, 2017, the firm failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system, including written supervisory procedures (“WSPs”), reasonably designed to achieve compliance with FINRA Rules concerning the accuracy of its OATS reporting, in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010. During the period September 22, 2015 through August 18, 2017, the firm’s WSPs in several areas were not reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and the Rules of FINRA and the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in violation of FINRA Rules 3110(b) and 2010.
FINRA v. BNP Paribas Securities Corp. (Case #2016051105201) – During two-and-a-half years within the period of February 25, 2013 to March 31, 2017 (the “Relevant Period”), BNP-SC and Prime (collectively, “BNP” or the “Firms”) accepted the deposit of nearly 31 billion shares of micro-cap and low-priced securities (“penny stocks”), with a notional value of approximately $338 million. BNP processed more than 70,000 wires with a total value of $233 billion, and at least 834 customer accounts associated with high-risk jurisdictions or foreign currency-denominated wire transfer activity purchased and sold penny stocks. These transactions by BNP’s customers, which included introducing brokers and “toxic debt financiers” known for depositing and reselling penny stocks, presented certain risks including, among other things, money laundering, fraud and lack of SEC registration. FINRA Rule 3310 requires member firms to develop and implement a risk-based, written AML Program, including policies and procedures, reasonably designed to monitor for potentially suspicious activity presented by the firm’s business. To be effective, an AML Program must consider the firm’s business model and types of transactions in which its customers engage, and include systems enabling the firm to monitor and investigate account activity that is suggestive of money laundering or other illegal activity. Despite the penny stock activity conducted through the Firms, BNP failed to develop and implement a written AML Program, including policies and procedures, that could reasonably be expected to detect and cause the reporting of potentially suspicious activity. Until 2016, BNP’s AML Program did not conduct any surveillance targeting transactions in penny stocks or securities trading outside of the traditional exchanges, and focused solely on wire transfers conducted in U.S. dollars. BNP did not review wires conducted in foreign currency, or any wires to determine whether they involved high-risk entities or jurisdictions, and its AML Program was not reasonably designed to identify wire transfers (or a pattern of wire transfers) conducted in amounts that would avoid attention or review. The AML Program was also understaffed, and its personnel lacked access to information critical to determining whether the wire activity they reviewed was suspicious, such as the customer’s background and historical account activity, or receipt of proceeds derived from the deposit or liquidation of penny stocks. BNP’s AML Program did not include procedures describing how the Firms’ investigators or supervisors were to conduct and document their review of alerts generated by BNP’s wire surveillance system, a deficiency identified by BNP’s affiliated auditor in 2014. Until 2016, BNP also did not have any procedures to transmit information concerning red flags identified in AML surveillance to the Firms’ personnel tasked with trade surveillance or receiving customer securities.
Gana Weinstein LLP has successfully handled hundreds of customer investment disputes with their brokerage firms. Our attorneys can help you detect and uncover suspicious activity in your accounts. Our consultations are free and we welcome all inquiries.